Part 5 CCFD Testimony
Part 5 VII. Why Communities of Interest Should be Handled Carefully and Applied only as Subordinate Criteria Communities of Interest (“COIs”) are a harmful basis for the initial drafting of legislative maps. COIs can be used as a cover to conceal partisan drafting or individual gerrymandering. COIs can be used as an excuse to pack liberals in cities and inner-ring suburbs, thereby cleansing their votes from surrounding territory. COIs can be used as an excuse to crack concentrations of opposing party voters. COIs are by their nature vague and not subject to mathematical or objective measurement. As such, using COIs as a primary criterion make it impossible for courts to establish objective, judicially manageable standards. Therefore, “Communities of Interest” should not be used as a primary criterion for redistricting because such a concept invites partisan and individual gerrymandering through cracking and packing. In LWV, the Court correctly held that COIs were to be given no primary weight in drafting districts and are among other considerations that should be “wholly subordinate” to the primary drafting criteria. As a result, and for the additional reasons set forth above, we respectfully request the LRC to relegate COIs to that secondary status. VIII. The CCFD Step-By-Step Method of Non-partisan Redistricting To ensure districts are compact and minimize the splitting of political subdivisions, CCFD offers the LRC and the Court a method of creating or repairing non-compact districts as follows: Step 1. Divide the state roughly into the required number of districts using the largest possible political subdivisions (e.g., counties or municipalities). For political units with a population larger than one district, first create as many (compact) whole districts as possible within the political unit, and then add the remaining unused territory as a single piece to a neighboring district. Assemble entire lower-population political units into compact districts. Step 2. Add or subtract whole political subdivisions, in layers, at the boundaries of the largest political subdivisions to begin to equalize population between districts. To equalize district populations further, add or subtract territory at the boundary of each larger political subdivision (e.g. counties) in layers using whole municipalities of the next smallest size. For example, if a Pennsylvania Senate district needs more voters to reach the target district population, first add whole municipalities along the entire border of a single district-edge county in layers until the target population is achieved. Municipalities from the next layer should not be added until the first layer is completely utilized. This is a very important technique to preempt the selection of territory based upon partisan goals of packing or cracking. The resulting boundaries likely will be straight lines. Step 3. Repeat the procedure in Step 2 with each level of smaller political subdivisions (e.g., municipalities, wards, precincts). At each level, no more than one political subdivision should be split between any pair of adjacent districts. No political subdivision should ever be divided between more than two districts unless its population is larger than that of two districts, in which case it should be divided among no more than the absolute minimum number of districts necessitated by its population. Step 4. Measure compactness and the number of split political subdivisions. Count the number of divided political units and compute the compactness of all the districts using one or more mathematical measures of compactness. In choosing among competing maps, preference should be given to those maps that achieve maximum compactness without excessive political subdivision splits. This reduces the discretion of would-be gerrymanderers to use non-compact, subdivision-breaking selection of territory to gather far-flung groups of opposing voters and pack them into as few districts as possible. Step 5. As a final step, make sure the districts do not inadvertently divide racial or linguistic groups. The resultant map should verify that the resulting compact districts do not inadvertently divide racial or linguistic minorities, which the federal Voting Rights Act prohibits. In most instances, no further adjustment will be needed, as compact districts that respect political subdivisions tend to preserve such communities. Any problems at this stage can usually be resolved with relatively slight adjustments of district boundaries. When the CCFD method is applied, the resulting map will satisfy both the Article 2, Section 16 and Article I, Section 5 criteria and requirements. The CCFD method makes partisan drafting of districts difficult, if not impossible, by denying drafters the ability to pick and choose territory based upon past voting behavior and replacing that discretion with compactly assembled districts, using whole political subdivisions to the maximum extent possible. An examination of how various voters are divided by irregular district boundaries almost always explains the decision of the drafter to include or exclude territory for partisan or other reasons. The CCFD method is based on neutral and objective drafting rules that can be measured mathematically, creating a judicially manageable and enforceable standard. Where the standard is abused or ignored, and lines deviate from the norm, courts can find a prima facie case of partisan intent. The drafters then would then be required to provide a neutral basis for their drafting choices. Compactness and the number of split counties, cities, townships, wards, precincts, and other political subdivisions (which are the result of a proposed map) lend themselves to mathematical calculations that easily can be used to compare proposed maps. CCFD’s methodology and the four key state constitutional criteria, if followed in drafting maps, not only allow courts to see at a glance whether partisan gerrymandering likely has occurred, but also enables courts to utilize objective mathematical measures to minimize, if not eliminate, partisan redistricting.